This paper applies the Extreme-Value (EV) Generalised Pareto distribution to the extreme tails of the return distributions for the S&P500, FT100, DAX, Hang Seng, and Nikkei225 futures contracts. It then uses tail estimators from these contracts to estimate spectral risk measures, which are coherent risk measures that reflect a user's risk-aversion function. It compares these to more familiar VaR and Expected Shortfall (ES) measures of risk, and also compares the precision and discusses the relative usefulness of each of these risk measures.
INTRODUCTION
One of most important functions of a futures clearinghouse is to act as counterparty to all trades that take place within its exchanges. This ensures that individual traders do not have to concern themselves with credit risk exposures to other traders, because the clearinghouse assumes all such risk itself. However, it also means that the clearinghouse has to manage this risk, and perhaps the most important way it can do so is by setting margin requirements to protect itself against possible default by investors who suffer heavy losses. But how should clearinghouses set their margin requirements?
A good starting point is that investor defaults are due to large -that is to say, extreme -price movements that are best analysed using some form of Extreme-Value (EV) theory. A number of papers have followed this line of inquiry (e.g., Longin (1999 Longin ( , 2000 and Booth et al (1997) ). Typically, extremes are modelled by applying a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) to exceedences X over a high threshold u.
The application of the GPD is justified by theory that tells us that exceedances should follow a GPD in the asymptotic limit as the threshold gets bigger. Once the GDP curve is fitted to the data, it can then be extrapolated to give us estimates of any quantiles or tail probabilities we choose. Where we are primarily interested in the tails of the distribution in modeling margin requirements, the GPD is far superior to alternatives such as a normal (Gaussian) distribution (as in Figlewski (1984) , which tends to under-estimate the heaviness of futures tail returns and is, in any case, inconsistent with any of the distributions that EV theory tells us to expect. Margin setting has also relied on historical distributions (see Edwards and Neftci (1988) and Warshawsky (1989) ), but historical approaches are unable to provide very low probability estimates due to insufficient data. Alternatively, time varying measures could be developed using, for example, GARCH type process (see Giannopoulos and Tunaru (2004 and Cotter (2001) ), but would involve continuous updating of futures margins on a daily basis.
These previous studies applying EV theory or other statistical models, have only applied margin requirements as a quantile or VaR. However, the VaR has been heavily criticised as a risk measure on the grounds that it does not satisfy the properties of coherence and, most particularly, because the VaR is not subadditive (Artzner et al. 1999; Acerbi, 2004) . The failure of VaR to be subadditive can then lead to strange and undesirable outcomes: in the present case, the use of the VaR to set margin requirements takes no account of the magnitude of possible losses exceeding VaR, and can therefore leave the clearinghouse heavily exposed to very high losses exceeding the VaR. 1 This paper first contributes to the literature by using an alternative risk measure that could but has yet to be applied to margin setting, namely the Expected Shortfall (ES). The ES is the average of the worst ∈ of losses, where ∈ is the confidence level. This measure is closely related, but not identical to, the Tail Conditional Expectation, which is the probability-weighted average of losses exceeding VaR.
2 Unlike the VaR, the ES is coherent (and hence subadditive as well)
and so satisfies many of the properties we would desire a priori from a 'respectable' risk measure. 3 The ES is (generally) bigger than the VaR and, more importantly, takes account of the magnitude of losses exceeding the VaR. These attractions suggest that the ES would provide a better basis for margin requirements than the VaR. However, both VaR and ES margin requirements would depend on the choice of a confidence level, and there is no a priori 'obvious' confidence level to choose. In addition, the use of VaR or ES to set clearinghouse margin requirements has the undesirable implication that the clearinghouse is either risk-loving or risk-neutral, and this sits uncomfortably with the common-sense notion that any clearinghouse should be risk averse.
1 One important consequence of using a non-subadditve risk measure like the VaR to set margin requirements is that investors might break up their accounts to reduce overall margin requirements, and in so doing leave the clearinghouse exposed to a hidden residual risk against which the clearinghouse has no effective collateral from its investors. This type of problem does not arise with subadditive risk measures such as the other ones considered in this paper.
2 For more on these risk measures and their distinguishing features, see Acerbi and Tasche (2001) or Acerbi (2004) . We don't consider the TCE further in this paper because it is equivalent to the ES where the density function is continuous, and where it differs from the ES, it is not coherent.
3 Loosely speaking, let X and Y represent any two portfolios' P/Ls (or future values, or the portfolios themselves) over a given forecast horizon, and let �(.) be a measure of risk. The risk measure �(.) is subadditive if it satisfies
( . Subadditivity is the most important criterion Y we would expect a 'respectable' risk measure to satisfy. It can be demonstrated that VaR is not subadditive unless we impose the empirically implausible requirement that returns are elliptically distributed. Given the importance of subadditivity, the VaR's non-subadditivity makes it very difficult to regard the VaR as a 'respectable' measure of risk. This paper further adds to the literature on margin setting by providing risk measures that specifically incorporate an agent's degree of risk aversion. In theory, the clearinghouse should use a risk measure that takes account of the nature and extent of its risk aversion. Thus a clearinghouse that is more risk averse would have a higher estimated risk measure and impose a higher margin requirement, other things being equal. Such risk measures have recently been proposed by Acerbi (2002 Acerbi ( , 2004 .
These measures are known as spectral risk measures because they relate the risk measure directly to the user's risk spectrum or risk-aversion function. 'Well-behaved' spectral risk measures are a subset of the family of coherent risk measures, and therefore have the attractions of coherent risk measures as well. One attractive type of spectral risk measure is based on an exponential risk aversion function. A nice feature of this type of spectral risk measure is that the extent of risk aversion depends on a single parameter ρ : the lower is ρ , the more risk-averse the user. In principle, once a clearinghouse chooses the value of ρ that reflects its own attitude to risk, it can then obtain an 'optimal' risk measure that directly reflects its risk aversion. So, whereas the VaR, previously applied in the literature, or even ES, are contingent on the choice of an arbitrary parameter, the confidence level, whose 'best' value cannot easily be determined, a spectral-coherent risk measure is contingent on a parameter whose 'best' value can in principle be ascertained by the clearinghouse that uses it. This paper provides a variety of alternative estimates of VaR, ES and spectral risk measures for each of 12 different types of contract, these being long and short positions in each of the S&P500, the FTSE100, the DAX, the Hang Seng, and the Nikkei225 indexes. It also compares these different estimates to each other. Bearing in mind that the value of any estimated risk measures depends crucially on their precision, the paper also examines alternative methods of estimating their precision.
Our findings on that front suggest the (controversial) conclusion that (at least in this context) estimates of ES are generally a little more precise than estimates of VaR, whereas estimates of the spectral risk measures are somewhat less precise than estimates of either of the other two risk measures. The former finding is encouraging in that it helps strengthen the argument that risk practitioners should 'upgrade' their risk measures from the VaR to the ES; however, the latter finding is a little disappointing in that it weakens a little the otherwise (to us compelling) argument that clearinghouses would do better still to upgrade to spectral risk measures. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the risk measures to be examined. Section 3 then reviews the extreme-value (EV) theory to be applied: the Peaks-Over-Threshold (POT) theory based on the Generalised Pareto distribution (GPD) applied to exceedances over a high threshold. Section 4 introduces the data and provides some preliminary data analysis on both long and short positions in five representative futures contracts. Section 5 then estimates VaR and ES, and section 6 estimates the spectral risk measures. Each of these sections also examines the precision of these estimated risk measures. Section 7 discusses these results and compares the suitability of each type of risk measure for futures clearinghouse margin requirements. Section 8 concludes.
MEASURES OF RISK
We are interested in three main risk measures, the first two (VaR and ES) mainly for comparison, and the third (spectral or, more properly, extreme-value coherent spectral-exponential risk measures) because we believe these are superior in principle and potentially more useful for determining how clearinghouse margin requirements should be set.
Let X be a random loss variable (which gives losses a positive sign and profits a negative one) over a daily horizon period on a futures contract position (which might itself be long or short in the underlying index). If the confidence level is ∈ , the VaR at this confidence level is:
where q ∈ is the relevant quantile of the loss distribution. We have already noted some of the problems with the VaR as a risk measure. 4 Viewed as a function of the quantiles of the loss distribution, it is also useful to note here that the VaR places all its weight on a single quantile that corresponds to a chosen confidence level, and it places no weight on any others.
Our second risk measure is the ES, which is the average of the worst 1 − ∈ of losses. In the case of a continuous loss distribution, the ES is given by:
-q p dp
Using an ES measure implies taking an average of quantiles in which tail quantiles have an equal weight and non-tail quantiles have a zero weight. However, the fact that the ES gives all tail losses equal weights suggests that a user who uses this measure is risk-neutral at the margin between better and worse tail outcomes, and this is inconsistent with risk-aversion.
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It is also possible to relate coherent risk measures to a user's risk aversion, and, indeed, to tailor coherent measures to fit a user's risk aversion. Let us define more general risk measures M � that are weighted averages of the quantiles q p :
0 where the weighting function, � ) ( , known as the risk spectrum or risk-aversion p function, still remains to be determined. 6 in terms of lower-partial moments (LPMs), which are probability-weighted deviations of returns r from some below-target return r * : more specifically, the LPM of order k φ 0 around r * is equal to E[max(0, r * − r) k ]. The parameter k reflects the degree of risk aversion, and the user is risk-averse if k > 1 , risk-neutral if k = 1 , and risk-loving if 0 < k < 1 . However, we would choose the VaR as our preferred risk measure only if k = 0 (Grootveld and Hallerbach, 2004, p. 35) , and this suggests that the use of the VaR as a preferred risk measure indicates negative risk aversion of a fairly extreme sort.
We are interested in the broader class of coherent risk measures, and want to know the conditions that � p) • Normalization: -� p dp = 1.
The first condition requires that the weights are non-negative, and the second requires that the probability-weighted weights should sum to 1. Both of these are obvious.
However, the third condition is a direct reflection of risk-aversion, and requires that the weights attached to higher losses should be bigger than, or certainly no less than, the weights attached to lower losses. This implies that the key to coherence is that a risk measure must give higher losses at least the same weight as lower losses. This explains why the VaR is not coherent and the ES is, and it also tells us that the VaR's most prominent inadequacies are closely related to its failure to satisfy the weakly increasing property.
If a user has a 'well-behaved' risk-aversion function, then the weights will rise smoothly, and the rate at which they do so is related to the degree of risk aversion: the more risk-averse the user, the more rapidly the weights will rise. This implies that there is an optimal risk measure for each user, which depends on the user's risk aversion function. Thus, two users might have identical portfolios, but they p=∈ an infinite weight, and every other outcome a zero weight, and the ES implies a discontinuous ) ( that takes the value 0 for profits or small losses and takes a constant value for high losses.
� p
However, these are not 'well-behaved' spectral risk measures, because they are inconsistent with risk aversion.. 7 For more on these, see Acerbi (2004, proposition 3.4) . There is also a good argument that spectral measures are the only really interesting coherent risk measures. Kusuoka (2001) and Acerbi (2004, pp. 180-182) show that all coherent risk measures that satisfy the two additional properties of comonotonic additivity and law invariance are also spectral measures. The former condition is that if two random variables X and Y are comonotonic (i.e., always move in the same direction), then Y
( ; comonotonic additivity is an important aspect of subadditivity, and represents the limiting case where diversification has no effect. Law-invariance is equivalent to the (in practice essential) requirement that a measure be estimable from empirical data. Both conditions are important, and coherent risk measures that do not satisfy them are probably not worth considering further.
will only have the same (coherent) risks if they also have exactly the same risk aversion.
To obtain a spectral risk measure, the user must specify a particular form for their risk-aversion function. This decision is subjective, but can be guided by the economic literature on utility-function theory. A user would pick some 'reasonable' utility function whose risk-aversion properties seem to reflect a suitable attitude toward risk. The chosen utility function could then be transformed into a risk aversion function suitable for risk measurement purposes. A plausible candidate is a standard exponential utility function, which can be transformed into an exponential risk-aversion function defined by
where ρ γ , 0 ( ≤ ) (see Acerbi, 2004, p. 178) . This function satisfies the conditions required of a spectral risk measure, and is also attractive because it is a simple function that depends on a single parameter, the value of which reflects the risk aversion of the user. A spectral risk-aversion function is illustrated in Figure 1 . This shows how the weights rise with the cumulative probability p, and the rate of increase depends on ρ : the more risk-averse the user, the more rapidly the weights rise.
Insert Figure 1 here
It is also curious to note that ρ plays a role in spectral measures similar to the role that the confidence level ∈ plays in the VaR and ES. More specifically, if we think in loose terms of a higher confidence level reflecting a greater concern with higher losses -which might reflect increasing risk-aversion in a crude sense -then this is comparable to a falling ρ in a spectral risk measure. However, whereas a falling ρ reflects a well-defined sense of increasing risk aversion, the choice of confidence level is arbitrary.
To obtain our spectral measure M � , we choose a value of ρ and substitute � ) ( p and q p ( X ) into M � to get:
(5) gives us our third risk measure, the spectral risk measure, contingent on a chosen value of ρ .
Of course, with all these risk measures we still face the problem of how to obtain the quantile q p , and it is to this problem that we now turn.
THE PEAKS OVER THRESHOLD (GENERALISED PARETO) APPROACH
As we are particularly interested in the extreme risks faced by the clearinghouse, we model extreme returns using an Extreme Value (EV) approach. Perhaps the most suitable of these for our purposes is the Peaks over Threshold (POT) approach based on the Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD).
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This approach focuses on the realisations of a random variable X over a high threshold u . More particularly, if X has the distribution function F (x ), we are interested in the distribution function F ) ( of u exceedances of X over a high threshold u :
As u gets large (as would be the case for the thresholds relevant to clearinghouses), then the distribution of exceedances tends to a GPD:
8 Alternatively, extreme tail returns could be modelled by Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) theory, which deals with the distribution of the sample maxima. The GEV and POT approaches are analogous in the limit, but we prefer to use the POT approach because it (generally) uses one less parameter, and because the GEV approach does not utilise all extreme returns if extremes occur in clusters.
and the shape ∞ and scale ≠ > 0 parameters are estimated conditional on the threshold u (Balkema and de Haan (1974) ; Embrechts e t a l. , 1997, pp. 162-164) . Note that the shape parameter ∞ sometimes appears in GPD discussions couched in terms of its inverse, a tail index parameter ∈ given by ∈ = 1/∞ .
The GPD parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. The log likelihood function of the GPD for ∞≥ 0 is:
where x i satisfies the constraints specified for x . If ∞ =0, the log likelihood function is:
ML estimates are then found by maximising the log-likelihood function using suitable (e.g., numerical optimisation) methods.
The behaviour of the GPD tail depends on the parameter values, and the shape parameter is especially important. A negative ∞ is associated with very thin-tailed distributions that are rarely of relevance to financial returns, and a zero ∞ is associated with other thin tailed distributions such as the normal. However, the most relevant for our purposes are heavy-tailed distributions associated with ∞ >0. The tails of such distributions decay slowly and follow a 'power law' function. Moreover the number of finite moments is ascertained by the value of ∞ : if ∞ * 0.5 (or, equivalently,
∈ φ 2) we have infinite second and higher moments; if ∞ * 0.25 (or ∈ φ 4), we have infinite fourth and higher moments, and so forth. ∈ thus indicates the number of finite moments. Evidence generally suggests that the second moment is probably finite, but the fourth moment is more problematic (see, e.g., Loretan and Phillips, 1994) .
Assuming that u is sufficiently high, the distribution function for exceedances is given by:
where n the sample size and N is the number of observations in excess of the u threshold (Embrechts et al., 1997, p. 354) . The p th quantile of the return distribution which is also the VaR at the (high) confidence level p -can then be obtained by inverting the distribution function:
The ES is then given by:
To obtain more general spectral risk measures, we substitute (11) into (5) to obtain:
Estimates of our risk measures are then obtained by estimating/choosing the relevant parameters and plugging these into the appropriate risk measure equation (i.e., (11), (12) or (13)). This is straightforward where our risk measures are the VaR and the ES; where our risk measures are spectral, we can solve (13) using a suitable numerical integration method (e.g., a trapezoidal rule, Simpson's rule, Monte Carlo, etc.). 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
Our data set consists of daily geometric returns (taken as the difference between the logs of respective end-of-day daily prices) for the most heavily traded index futuresthat is, the S&P500, FTSE100, DAX, Hang Seng and Nikkei 225 futures -between January 1 1991 and December 31 2003.
As a preliminary, Figure 2 shows QQ plots for these contracts' empirical return distributions relative to a normal (or Gaussian) distribution. If the normal distribution is an adequate fit, then the QQ plot should be approximately a straight line. However, in each case, we find that the QQ plot is approximately straight only in the central region, but not for the tails. For their part, the tails -on both left-hand and right-hand sides -of the QQ plot show steeper slopes than the central observations, indicating that the tails exhibit excess kurtosis (or tail heaviness) relative to the normal distribution. These findings are consistent with the widely held perception that both long and short futures positions are heavy-tailed.
Insert Figure 2 here
In addition, the points where the QQ plots change shape provide us with natural estimates of tail thresholds. These lead us to select thresholds of 2 for the S&P, DAX, Hang Seng and Nikkei indices, and to select a threshold of 1.5 for the FTSE.
This choice of threshold values is also consistent with the tail index plotsplots of the estimated tail index ∈ and its 95% confidence interval against the number of exceedances -shown in Figure 3 . The number of exceedances reflects the choice of threshold, a smaller number reflecting a higher threshold. In each case the More details on such methods can be found in standard references (e.g., Miranda and Fackler (2002, chapter 5). 13 9 estimated tail index is stable over a wide range of exceedance numbers (or threshold size, if you prefer). This tells us that the estimated indices are stable over the thresholds selected.
Insert Figure 3 here
We now assume that the distributions of exceedances take the form of GPDs, and ML estimates of the GPD parameters are given in Table 1 
Insert Table 1 here
To check that the GPD provides an adequate fit, Figure 4 shows empirical exceedances fitted to the GPDs based on the parameter estimates given in Table 1 .
The GPD provides a good fit in all cases, and this confirms both the selection of the GPD as an appropriate distribution and the parameter estimates on which the fitted distribution is predicated.
Insert Figure 4 here

ESTIMATION OF VAR AND EXPECTED SHORTFALL
Estimates of VaRs and ESs based on these parameters are shown in Table 2 
Insert Table 3
However, it can be argued that a straight comparison of standard errors is likely to be unfair, because the ratio of the ES to its standard error (coefficients of variation) is generally larger than the ratio of the VaR to its standard error. A comparison of these coefficients of variations would then suggest that where the ES is in relative terms more precisely estimated than the VaR. To investigate this issue further, Table 4 presents estimates of the 90% confidence intervals for the two risk measures. To facilitate their comparison, these confidence intervals are standardised (i.e., divided) by the corresponding mean risk measures. So, for example, for a confidence level of 98%, the first result on the top row of Table 4 tells us that the 90% confidence interval spans the range 0.9476 to 1.0560 of the mean (or expected) VaR.
The results presented here show that the ES confidence intervals are narrower than the VaR ones, and confirm that the ES is estimated relatively more precisely than the VaR.
Insert Table 4 here
These results also indicate a second interesting finding: for relatively low confidence levels they are more or less symmetric, but for higher confidence levels (and especially a confidence level of 0.999), the confidence intervals are notably asymmetric: in particularly, the right bound of the confidence level is further away from the mean than the left bound. This tells us that we cannot use symmetric textbook confidence intervals based on the underlying central limit theorem assumptions when dealing with risk measures at very extreme confidence levels. The explanation for this asymmetry is that at these very high confidence levels the data are notably more sparse on the right-hand side than on the left-hand side of the confidence interval, and this greater sparsity pulls the right-hand bound of the interval further away from the mean.
ESTIMATION OF SPECTRAL RISK MEASURES
As noted already, to apply a spectral risk measure requires that we first choose a suitable value for the risk-aversion parameter ρ . In principle, the value of this parameter is a matter of choice, subject only to the constraint that ρ be positive.
However, in the present context where we are primarily concerned with extremes, we need a relatively low ρ value (i.e., a high-degree of risk-aversion) for the application of an EV approach to make sense. The reason why can be seen in Figure 1 . If we have a relatively low degree of risk aversion (e.g., such as that implied by ρ = . 0 05 ), then the risk-aversion weights applied to extreme losses are not much higher than those for somewhat lower losses; in such circumstances, we would be concerned with losses over a relatively wide range of confidence levels and we would have no reason to apply an EV approach in the first place. On the other hand, with a very high degree of risk-aversion (e.g., ρ = . 0 005 ), then the weights attached to extreme losses are much higher than those attached to smaller losses -indeed, the weights attached to smaller losses are negligible -and in these circumstances we have little real choice but to apply an EV approach. A casual inspection of Figure 1 thus suggests that in the present context we would want to work with a ρ value well below 0.05.
Having chosen a ρ value, we calculate the integral (13), which we can do using numerical integration. This requires that we approximate the continuous integral by a discrete equivalent: we discretise the continuous variable p into a number N of discrete slices, where the approximation gets better as N gets larger. We also have to choose a suitable numerical integration method, and some obvious ones are trapezoidal and Simpson's rules, and quasi-Monte Carlo methods (e.g., using
Niederreiter and Weyl algorithms).
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To evaluate the accuracy of these methods, Table 5 gives estimates of the spectral-exponential risk-measure approximation errors generated by these alternative numerical integration methods based on various values of N and a plausible set of benchmark parameters (i.e., more specifically, the mean long-position parameters in Table 1 
Insert Table 5 here Insert Figure 7 here
For the purposes of the remaining estimations, we selected a benchmark method consisting of the trapezoidal rule calibrated with N=1 million, and the results just examined suggest that this benchmark should deliver highly accurate estimates.
Estimates of the spectral-exponential risk measures themselves are given in As with the earlier risk measures, it also important to gauge the precision of these estimates. Accordingly, Table 7 presents estimates of the standard errors of the spectral risk measures based on a parametric bootstrap similar to our earlier ones.
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These results show us that the estimated standard errors are broadly similar across futures contracts, but increase as ρ falls: this makes sense because a falling ρ implies that we are placing ever more weight on fewer observations; this suggests that the effective sample size is falling and a smaller effective sample size implies a higher standard error. However, this increase in standard errors is quite substantial: for example, for the long S&P500 contract, ρ = .
0 05 produces a standard error of 0.1575, whereas ρ = .
0 005 produces a standard error of 0.8862. In terms of a rough order of As with the earlier bootstrap, this involves resampling from the estimated distribution function. However, in doing so we also have to restrain the number of slices N to the sample size: the parametric bootstrap therefore involves N=3392. 0 005 are even wider. Thus, our results present clear evidence that estimates of spectral-exponential risk measures are less precise than estimates of VaR or ES The explanation for the wider confidence intervals of the spectral measures would again appear to be related to effective sample size: to see this, note that the ES has a fixed sample size given by the number of tail observations, whereas a spectral risk measure predicated on a high degrees of risk aversion effectively puts a lot of weight on a small number of tail observations, and therefore operates with fewer effective observations.
DISCUSSION
All our estimated risk measures show considerable similarity. They all agree that the S&P and FTSE contracts are the least risky indices, and that the Hang Seng is the most risky. The use of any of these measures for setting margin requirements would therefore lead to the former ones having the lowest margin requirements and to the Hang Seng having the highest. All the estimated risk measures also agree that there is only mild asymmetry across long and short positions, and this suggests that there should be only small differences across the margin requirements of long and short positions.
It is also interesting that all three types of risk measure react in similar ways as the appropriate key parameter (i.e., the confidence level in the case of the VaR and ETL, and ρ in the case of the spectral measures) changes. In all cases, the estimated risk measure depends critically on the value of the key parameter, and the relevant plots (of risk measure against key parameter) are all close to exponential. However, whilst these plots look broadly similar, the different risk measures vary considerably in terms of their interpretation and usefulness:
• The VaR is of limited use for setting margin requirements because a VaR as such gives the clearinghouse no indication of how big its losses might be in the event that an investor suffers losses that exhaust its margin. As far as the clearinghouse is concerned, the only practically useful VaR information relates to the probability of default associated with any given VaR: if clearinghouse risk managers have a VaR calculation engine, then they can use it to work out the default probabilities associated with particular margin requirements interpreted as VaRs. VaR information is also limited in so far as it is contingent on the confidence level, but there is little a priori guide to tell the clearinghouse what particular confidence level it should work with.
• The ES is more useful to the clearinghouse than the VaR because it does, and the VaR does not, take account of the sizes of losses higher than the VaR itself.
It also has the helpful interpretation that it tells the clearinghouse the loss an investor can expect to make conditional on it experiencing a loss that exceeds a chosen VaR threshold. So if the clearinghouse sets a VaR-based margin requirement, then the ES tells the clearinghouse the expected default loss conditional on the investor experiencing a loss that exceeds its margin. This said, the ES measure is also contingent on a confidence level, and there is little a priori guide to tell the clearinghouse what that should be.
• The spectral risk measures are in principle the most useful, because they alone take account of the user's (i.e., clearinghouse's) degree of risk aversion: the more risk averse the user, the greater the risk measure. This gives clearinghouse risk managers an opportunity to select a ρ value that reflects the clearinghouse's corporate risk aversion. So, whereas the VaR or the ES are contingent on a key parameter whose value is to a greater or lesser extent arbitrary, spectral measures are contingent on a key parameter whose value can be determined from the clearinghouse's risk appetite. Thus, spectral measures are generally better both because they take account of the clearinghouse's risk aversion, and because their key parameter can be chosen from it. Spectral risk measures can be higher or lower than the earlier risk measures, depending on the sizes of the two key parameters, but our confidence-interval results also suggest that spectral risk measures have a tendency to be less precisely estimated than the VaR or the ES -which is unfortunate given the advantages of spectral risk measures over earlier ones.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
By acting as a counterparty in all trades, a clearinghouse relieves individual traders of credit risk concerns but acquires credit-risk exposures of its own. It then seeks to manage these exposures by imposing margin requirements. However, even with margin requirements the clearinghouse is still exposed to the risk of loss arising from investor defaults triggered by extreme price movements located in the tail of a distribution. This paper has sought to model these risks using an EV approach, where margin requirements might be set using one of three different financial risk measures: the VaR, the Expected Shortfall (ES), and spectral-coherent risk measures. This paper compares the three approaches for margin setting as to whether risk aversion is explicitly incorporated into the risk measures. Both VaR and ES do not incorporate risk aversion, and as a consequence result in inappropriate attitudes to risk, being either risk lovers (VaR) or risk neutral (ES). In contrast, spectral risk measures allow clearinghouses specifically exhibit their degree of risk aversion, and importantly attach greater weights to the more extreme price movements, those associated with investor default. The paper illustrates the relative merits of the approaches by noting, for example, that spectral measures are not only coherent like ES measures, but also allow for unique margins with varying risk aversion across contract type and trading position.
Furthermore, the paper examines the empirical features of the alternative approaches to margin setting. Comparing the margin requirements based on VaR and ES measures, we see two desirable results for the latter, namely, they takes some account of losses beyond the various quantiles, and are also more precise than VaR measures. Whilst the spectral measures incorporate varying degrees of risk aversion by giving higher weights to the more extreme returns unlike the equal weighting scheme of ES measures, the paper finds that the spectral measures are generally less precise. Given the obvious benefits that spectral measures offer economic agents, it would be interesting to determine if the choice of utility function is driving the lack of precision and this will be investigated in future work. Table presents estimates of the GPD parameters for long and short futures positions in the five contracts shown. The sample size n is 3392, the threshold is u, the probability of an observation in ê xcess of u is prob, the number of exceedences in excess of u is N u , the estimated tail parameter is ∞ and the estimated scale parameter is ≠ˆ . The numbers in brackets are the estimated standard errors of the parameters concerned. The thresholds u are chosen as the approximate points where the QQ plots in Figure 2 change slope. Table 1 .
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